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VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS  
IN CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION 
Benjamin Levin∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Ignorance isn’t bliss; a system rooted in faulty assumptions and 
unproven hunches risks terrible mistakes and cannot represent the best 
interests of justice.  Professor Andrew Crespo’s Systemic Facts: To-
ward Institutional Awareness in Criminal Courts starts from this sim-
ple yet critically important insight to offer a compelling policy pre-
scription for the United States’s failing criminal courts.1  If these 
courts are to rule fairly and preside effectively over the functions of 
the criminal justice system, Crespo argues, they need to operate 
against some baseline of accuracy.  Their decisions must be rooted in 
facts — facts that have a foundation in lived experience and the com-
munity that the lawyers and judges of the court purport to represent.  
In Crespo’s account, courts routinely ignore these facts, although the 
facts are known and readily accessible.2  They are the facts that judges 
confront every day — the race of criminal defendants, the accuracy of 
police predictions, and the rates of crimes committed in a given neigh-
borhood.3  Crespo argues that by internalizing, embracing, and incor-
porating these facts into their decisions and case management, criminal 
courts may provide a check on a range of procedural abuses.  These 
“systemic facts” may assure a degree of accuracy in the criminal justice 
system and ensure that judges, rather than police or prosecutors, are 
able to contextualize each case. 
This Response, which proceeds in two Parts, considers the promises 
and limitations of Crespo’s proposed approach to systemic facts.  In 
Part I, I argue that Crespo presents a compelling case for the im-
portance of systemic factfinding to the task of criminal court judges.  
If, as a range of scholars has argued, criminal courts are increasingly 
serving a quasi-administrative function, then shouldn’t they at least be 
administrating accurately?  Systemic Facts provides a novel account of 
how — with comparatively little institutional reform — courts might 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School.  Thanks to Andrew Crespo 
for generously welcoming these critiques and to the Harvard Law Review for inviting my Re-
sponse and for editorial guidance.  Thanks also to Susannah Barton Tobin for helpful comments 
and suggestions. 
 1 Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal 
Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049 (2016). 
 2 See generally id. pts. II–III, 2065–101. 
 3 See generally id. 
  
380 HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 129:379 
begin to serve as more effective administrators.  However, in Part II, I 
also argue that Crespo’s account largely takes for granted the unmiti-
gated benefit of more data and more information.  I argue that 
Crespo’s account understates the indeterminacy of systemic facts and 
the ways in which data rely on interpreters and interpretations.  To the 
extent our criminal justice system already suffers from the assumptions 
and biases of judges and other official actors, granting those same ac-
tors the ability to interpret a wealth of data or “facts” need not dictate 
a move toward greater justice or greater accuracy.  Rather, it might al-
low the same actors to reach the same decisions, supported by the 
same underlying assumptions, but bolstered by a powerful new da-
taset.  Ultimately, systemic factfinding might highlight the problems 
with criminal courts, but it would not necessarily provide a vehicle for 
reform or redress. 
I.  FACTS SUPERSEDING ASSUMPTIONS 
Systemic Facts is framed as an intervention into what Crespo dubs 
the “New Administrativist” literature.4  The New Administrative 
scholars have recognized that criminal courts operate on a transaction-
al basis — processing large numbers of defendants, in a one-off fash-
ion, almost always without trial.5  In such a context, these scholars 
have concluded that courts are ill-suited to the task at hand, a task 
that is essentially administrative in nature and that requires broader 
knowledge of and engagement with the criminal justice system.6  By 
embracing the insights and institutions of administrative law, these 
scholars have advocated for administrative solutions to systemic prob-
lems.7  Perhaps police or law enforcement agencies should self-
regulate, or perhaps some other executive agency should be tasked 
with oversight.  But the solutions that these scholars have proposed 
(and that Crespo responds to) presume that courts are not the ideal 
regulatory body to prevent official misconduct.8 
Crespo posits a similar world in which the transactional model 
hampers systemic engagement.  But he concludes that reformers need 
not look beyond courts themselves to find the best actors to preside 
over the administration of criminal justice.9  Rather, Crespo contends 
that courts already have access to numerous facts — arrest locations 
and demographics, accuracy of police testimony, and prosecutors’ dis-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 4 Id. at 2057–59. 
 5 See id. at 2054–57. 
 6 See id. 
 7 See id. at 2057–58. 
 8 See id. at 2057. 
 9 See id. at 2059–65. 
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closure of Brady10 material — that should allow courts to perform the 
sort of systemic management that the New Administrativists seek.11  
Additionally, Crespo contends that court-centric solutions actually may 
be more politically feasible than a delegation of authority to some oth-
er regulatory agency.12 
This intervention is noteworthy on its own terms, but Systemic 
Facts should also be seen as a contribution to a different scholarly tra-
dition: the call for empiricism (or perhaps empirical accuracy) in judi-
cial decisionmaking.  At its core, the article is a part of a larger realist 
project that seeks to challenge judicial assumptions by describing both 
the factual circumstances and the effects of judicial decisionmaking.13  
Courts reach decisions based on assumptions about facts on the 
ground and about how their rulings affect criminal defendants, police, 
and prosecutors.  But many of these assumptions have no empirical or 
authoritative support.  A judge may conclude that a stop was justified 
because it occurred in a “high crime area,” but the law does not re-
quire — and judges rarely provide — any evidence of a neighbor-
hood’s crime rates.14  So we are left with an opinion and a legal rule 
that purport to rely on empirical evidence, but we have no such evi-
dence against which to test the court’s conclusion. 
In Crespo’s view, decisions unsupported by systemic facts have two 
potential flaws: (1) their reasoning is not transparent, and (2) the deci-
sions themselves might not be based on accurate information.  As to 
the first objection, Crespo is undoubtedly correct, and his argument for 
courts’ use of systemic facts appears responsive.  Writing a decade and 
a half ago, Professors Tracey Meares and Bernard Harcourt “call[ed] 
for a mode of judicial decision-making and academic debate that treats 
social scientific and empirical assessment as a crucial element in con-
stitutional decision-making, thereby making criminal procedure deci-
sions more transparent.”15  As Meares and Harcourt put it, “[j]udicial 
decisions that address the relevant social science and empirical data 
are more transparent in that they expressly articulate the grounds for 
factual assertions and, as a result, more clearly reflect the interpretive 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 10 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 11 See generally Crespo, supra note 1, at pts. II–III, 2065–101. 
 12 See id. at 2063–64. 
 13 See, e.g., Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 227 (2015); Tracey L. 
Meares, Three Objections to the Use of Empiricism in Criminal Law and Procedure — And Three 
Answers, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 851; Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Trans-
parent Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733 (2000); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Sci-
entific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803 (2014); Seth W. Stoughton, Polic-
ing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847 (2014). 
 14 See Crespo, supra note 1, at 2079–85. 
 15 Meares & Harcourt, supra note 13, at 735. 
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choices involved in criminal procedure decision-making.”16  How can 
an appellate court make its decision if the record below has factual 
gaps?  And how can policymakers and activists determine if rules (or 
judges)17 need changing if they cannot assess the basis for a ruling?  
Opinions and decisions supported by evidence would allow observers 
(litigants, politicians, and activists) to appreciate the judge’s normative 
views.  That is, when a judge “shows her work” or provides the under-
lying facts or data on which she relies, it is easier to determine whether 
she reached the “right” result. 
As to Crespo’s second objection, certainly accuracy is an issue.  Re-
cent scholarly critiques of criminal procedure jurisprudence make a 
strong case that the assumptions driving (or at least justifying) many 
decisions are not supported by facts on the ground.18  For example, 
Professor Seth Stoughton has shown that the Court frequently relies on 
erroneous assumptions about the nature of policing.19  Similarly, Pro-
fessor Shima Baradaran Baughman has provided empirical evidence 
to undermine the nexus between drugs and violence that the Court has 
used to justify expansive police powers in drug cases.20  Encouraging 
courts to collect and apply systemic facts might help judges reach more 
accurate results by forcing them to test their assumptions against facts 
on the ground.  Or, at the very least, the tension between those facts 
and a judge’s assumptions might be clearer to the parties or to review-
ing courts.21 
Crespo’s insights are valuable, and Systemic Facts makes an im-
portant contribution to the growing literature on systemic reform of 
criminal justice policy.  By emphasizing courts’ access to a wealth of 
information about policing and prosecution, he has provided a key in-
sight into the literature on judicial empiricism in constitutional crimi-
nal law.  But, as I discuss in the next Part, I think he is too optimistic 
about the effectiveness of more facts when it comes to changing out-
comes and is insufficiently focused on the ideological and structural 
barriers that might not make courts the best actors to interpret system-
ic facts. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 16 Id. 
 17 More on this point in Part II. 
 18 See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., Foreword: Testing the Constitution, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1001, 
1024 (2015); Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L. REV. 913, 
915 (2009). 
 19 See generally Stoughton, supra note 13. 
 20 See generally Baradaran, supra note 13. 
 21 See Crespo, supra note 1, at 2099–101. 
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II.  ASSUMPTIONS SUPERSEDING FACTS 
Legal and factual analysis cannot be divorced from a judge’s pri-
ors.22  In noting the limitations of systemic facts, Crespo acknowledges 
that “systemic factfinding cannot replace the exercise of careful judg-
ment when it comes to the core normative questions at the heart of the 
criminal justice system, nor will it necessarily force judges to abandon 
any preexisting views they might hold.”23  This observation does not 
necessarily undermine the importance of systemic facts.  But it does 
raise the question of why courts are the best place for applying (rather 
than collecting) systemic facts.  That is, Crespo’s analysis seems to 
turn on a belief that it is factual ignorance, rather than normative 
preferences or priors, that is to blame for courts’ shortcomings.  I’m 
not sure that he is right.  And, at the very least, a decision to grant 
courts broader administrative authority should require a closer inspec-
tion of the forces and preferences that shape criminal courts.24 
What are “criminal courts”?  And how can we trust them to know, 
digest, and apply facts?  As a project, Systemic Facts shows a desire to 
take institutions seriously.25  Crespo reminds us that too much scholar-
ship focuses on appellate courts, ignoring the realities of the trial 
courts that shape the criminal justice system.26  This critique strikes 
me as accurate, but if this institutional turn is important, then we need 
a thicker descriptive account of the institutions themselves.  That is, 
we need to know the identities of the individual decisionmakers, as 
well as their incentives.  In order to decide that courts are better situ-
ated than other actors (namely police or prosecutors) to weigh interests 
of “liberty” and “security,”27 we need to understand courts’ relation-
ships to police, prosecutors, and other criminal justice actors. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 22 See, e.g., JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 
1–4 (1983); GARY MINDA, BOYCOTT IN AMERICA: HOW IMAGINATION AND IDEOLOGY 
SHAPE THE LEGAL MIND 8–13 (1999); RICHARD D. PARKER, “HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE”: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST MANIFESTO 53–115 (1994); Kathryn Abrams, Some Realism 
About Electoralism: Rethinking Judicial Campaign Finance, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 505, 509 (1999); 
Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in 
Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1218 (1990); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of 
Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 428 (1999); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, 
Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1766–67 (1997). 
 23 Crespo, supra note 1, at 2114; see also Meares & Harcourt, supra note 13, at 793–94, 797. 
 24 In raising these questions, I don’t mean to suggest that some other actors or institutions 
necessarily would be better at this task than courts.  That is, priors or normative preferences may 
shape the ways that judges interpret or collect data, but they would also shape the ways in which 
administrative or executive actors would interpret and collect such data. 
 25 See Crespo, supra note 1, at 2056 (“[T]he discussion that follows is concerned . . . [with] 
criminal courts’ institutional structure, design, and capacity.”). 
 26 See id. at 2052–53. 
 27 See id. at 2061. 
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Such an understanding would require that we excavate the inner 
workings of criminal courts.  Crespo explains that his “references to a 
‘criminal court’ are to the court as an institution, and thus generally 
encompass both the judges who adjudicate cases and the administra-
tive personnel who assist the court in carrying out its judicial func-
tion.”28  As lawyers, we generally use “courts” and “judges” inter-
changeably, but doing so undersells the human components of the 
judicial system.  Therefore, Crespo’s observation is an important one 
and a potential curative for this common elision.  But his definition 
operates as a footnoted aside rather than a broader lens through which 
we might view his analysis and proposal. 
If we are to trust “courts” with the impressive array of tasks that 
Crespo would assign them, then I think we need to know more about 
courts.  Or, in other words, we need to recognize that courts, as institu-
tions, are made up of different actors with different interests, incen-
tives, and priors.  Data do not speak for themselves, so we would need 
to understand who would be interpreting the raw data in Crespo’s 
proposed world of systemic factfinding.29 
From Professor Malcolm Feeley’s The Process Is the Punishment30 
to Professor Issa Kohler-Hausmann’s Managerial Justice,31 scholars of 
law and society have taken on the task of exposing the hidden players 
and dynamics in criminal courts.  While I am not suggesting that Sys-
temic Facts should have been an ethnographic work, I want to empha-
size (as Crespo acknowledges) that “courts” are not monolithic.  There 
are many actors and decisionmakers whom we might identify as part 
of the “court” and who might be implicated in the identification and 
interpretation of systemic facts.  Members of the probation depart-
ment, law clerks, staff attorneys, and docket clerks might have very 
different backgrounds, training, and incentives from the judges they 
assist.32  In a court system that adopted Crespo’s proposal, these actors 
might well be important components of the judicial apparatus charged 
with amassing and digesting systemic facts. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 28 Id. at 2054 n.8. 
 29 Crespo suggests that courts might require “expert assistance” to process and interpret data, 
see id. at 2053, 2082, which would introduce yet another set of actors (that is, the “experts”) whose 
interpretation would in turn depend on their own priors, assumptions, and views of the criminal 
justice system. 
 30 MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A 
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979). 
 31 Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611 
(2014). 
 32 While it focuses on the federal system, recent research by political scientists has examined 
the political ideology of law clerks and what it does (and doesn’t) reflect about judicial politics.  
See generally Adam Bonica et al., The Political Ideologies of Law Clerks and their Judges (Univ. 
of Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 756, 2016), h t t p : / / p a p e r s . s s r n 
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2739478 [http://perma.cc/MLU8-48NS]. 
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Further, what of the judges themselves?  If “courts” are primarily 
“judges,” then Crespo’s proposal is primarily an embrace of an expan-
sive vision of the judicial role.  In Crespo’s proposal, judges would 
adopt a quasi-inquisitorial model as keepers and interpreters of sys-
temic facts.  While Crespo is careful to rebut concerns about a dearth 
of adversarialism, he has much less to say about the politics and incen-
tives of the individual judges.33  Judicial elections, he notes, might 
make us worry about the ability of courts to serve as impersonal and 
neutral fiduciaries of fact.34  Yet, outside of some discussion of judges’ 
technical capacity to interpret data, Crespo scarcely mentions judges’ 
personal characteristics.  Are they former prosecutors or defense attor-
neys?35  Is it common for former civil litigators to preside over crimi-
nal courts?  Do judges tend to come from the same communities as the 
defendants appearing before them? 
These questions fall outside of the scope of Systemic Facts, but in 
order to assess the merits of Crespo’s proposal, I think we need to an-
swer them.  Assuming that a judge’s experiences or priors shape the 
way that she interprets a given case, her interpretation (and perhaps 
collection) of systemic facts would also rest on these assumptions and 
biases.36  That is, systemic facts about criminal adjudication might be 
contingent on a range of facts about criminal courts themselves.  In-
formation on the composition of the federal bench is readily accessi-
ble,37 but biographical and demographic information about state trial 
court judges should also be a part of the discussion.38  If one of the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 33 While such a discussion is absent from Systemic Facts, other work by Crespo emphasizes 
judges’ priors and experiences, noting their importance to judicial decisionmaking.  See Andrew 
Manuel Crespo, Regaining Perspective: Constitutional Criminal Adjudication in the U.S. Su-
preme Court, 100 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016); see also Crespo, supra note 1, at 2113 n.283. 
 34 Crespo, supra note 1, at 2112–13. 
 35 It is worth noting that studies suggest that judges with prosecutorial experience tend to out-
number those with criminal defense experience (particularly those with experience as public de-
fenders).  See, e.g., Gregory L. Acquaviva & John D. Castiglione, Judicial Diversity on State Su-
preme Courts, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 1203, 1235 tbl.10 (2009).  Given that Crespo expresses 
skepticism about the ability of law enforcement to self-regulate, perhaps we should ask whether 
this skepticism about prosecutorial approaches to the criminal justice system evaporates when a 
prosecutor is nominated or elected to the bench. 
 36 Cf. Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrim-
ination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1036–37 (2006) (de-
scribing studies showing that decisionmakers “spontaneously search for independent decision cri-
teria consistent with their preference, and use those criteria to justify their choices to themselves 
and others” (citing Michael I. Norton et al., Casuistry and Social Category Bias, 87 J. PERSONAL-
ITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 817, 829 (2004))). 
 37 See The Judicial Research Initiative at the Univ. of S.C., Attributes of Federal Judges, U. 
S.C., http://artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/juri/attributes.htm [http://perma.cc/25KB-ATB5]. 
 38 For more on the background of attorneys and other members of the judiciary, see generally 
Adam Bonica et al., The Political Ideologies of American Lawyers (HKS Working Paper No. 15-
049, 2015), h t t p : / / p a p e r s . s s r n . c o m / s o l 3 / p a p e r s . c f m ? a b s t r a c t _ i d = 2 6 5 2 7 0 6  [ h t t p : / / p e r m a . c c / 7 G V C 
-PN8T]. 
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primary purposes of Systemic Facts is to argue that courts themselves 
should find, interpret, and apply facts, then judges’ priors, incentives, 
assumptions, and training require greater attention.39  Indeed, Crespo, 
like the New Administrativists and most scholars of criminal law, 
takes as a starting premise that the criminal justice system has “gone 
‘seriously awry’” — that courts are failing to reign in abuses and mis-
conduct and that the rules in place are not resulting in a fair admin-
istration of justice.40  If that is the case, then courts have already prov-
en inadequate when faced with the task of reigning in a system run 
amok.  Crespo’s answer seems to be that if we give courts more infor-
mation they will see the error of their ways.  Maybe.  And, maybe, as 
Crespo acknowledges, such an outcome is more likely when a judge is 
presented with a particularly glaring set of facts.41   
I agree with Crespo that more facts might help judges realize their 
implicit biases, but the beauty of Crespo’s policy proposal is also a ma-
jor issue for this line of argument: the reason that courts (rather than 
agencies) are well suited to apply systemic facts is that courts already 
know those facts.  That is, on a daily basis, courts see who is arrested, 
hear officers testify, and preside over voir dire conducted by the same 
prosecutors.  While the transactional nature of criminal adjudication 
might obscure the cumulative impact of individual decisions, it is im-
portant to recognize that criminal courts have had the opportunity to 
learn from these facts.  And it is not clear that they have taken ad-
vantage of this opportunity.  Put simply, my concern with Systemic 
Facts is that I think it is too optimistic in its assumption that the col-
lection and explicit reliance on facts will be effective in significantly 
reducing the problems posed by incentives of political economy, by 
ideological priors, and by assumptions about how the world works. 
Certainly, one response to these critiques would be to throw up our 
hands and reject empiricism and the prospect of using systemic facts 
to achieve systemic reform.  But that would be wrong.42  These facts 
(and empirical evidence generally) can play an important role in im-
proving the transparency and function of the criminal justice system.  
In this respect, I agree with Crespo.  The criminal justice system has 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 39 In addressing the question of courts’ and judges’ competency to interpret data, Crespo notes 
the rise of “empirical legal studies as a robust academic discipline.”  See Crespo, supra note 1, at 
2104.  While he is certainly right that elite law schools have focused more research and resources 
on empirical methods and on scholars in these fields, it is less clear how much these developments 
would affect the criminal court judges that Crespo describes.  Determining that influence would 
require us to know more about judges’ ages, education, and ties to legal academia. 
 40 See id. at 2059 (quoting Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1829 (2015)). 
 41 See id. at 2113. 
 42 See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, LANGUAGE OF THE GUN: YOUTH, CRIME, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY, at xi–xii (2006). 
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dramatic and tragic real-world effects.  I agree that it would be a nor-
mative good if the rules and decisions that undergird the system had 
some support in the facts on the ground.  To the extent that they do 
not, I agree that it is important that we know, so that we can work to 
determine the best solutions.  But more facts do not necessarily mean 
more justice or fairer outcomes. 
Indeed, the excellent defenses of judicial empiricism articulated by 
Harcourt, Meares, and (at points in Systemic Facts) Crespo himself fo-
cus on empiricism’s promises and limits in improving criminal adjudi-
cation.  Harcourt has argued that social scientists should “orient the 
empirical project specifically on the assumptions embedded in law and 
policy making.  Rather than use the research to draw law and policy 
inferences, use the research to expose the assumptions about human 
behavior that . . . underlie the law and policy proposals.”43  And, 
Crespo suggests that systemic facts can “excavate, illuminate, and crys-
tallize those normative questions, allowing courts to engage them more 
directly and with greater nuance and precision.”44 
To me, this is the power of empiricism, and it is one of the reasons 
that I applaud Systemic Facts.  Crespo has gone to great lengths to 
acknowledge what systemic facts cannot do.45  And that is critically 
important.  But if what systemic facts can do is highlight normative 
preferences and demonstrate judicial assumptions, then how would 
they allow courts to do all the tasks that the New Administrativists 
have identified?46  And how would they necessarily make substantive 
outcomes better, rather than merely more transparent?  If we want to 
right the ship of U.S. criminal justice, we need a systemic reevaluation 
and a means of checking and reforming actors systemically.  Certainly, 
understanding what is wrong and increasing transparency so that 
more people can appreciate what is wrong are important steps.  But 
without challenging the values, assumptions, and “pathological poli-
tics”47 that shape criminal courts, it is not clear how more facts — sys-
temic, or otherwise — will allow courts to police themselves and serve 
as the organs of criminal justice reform. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 43 Id. at xi; see also Meares & Harcourt, supra note 13, at 735 (“[U]se of empirical evidence will 
produce a clearer picture of the existing constitutional landscape and spotlight the normative 
judgments at the heart of criminal procedure cases.” (quoted in Crespo, supra note 1, at 2102 
n.233)); Deborah Jones Merritt, Correspondence, Constitutional Fact and Theory: A Response to 
Chief Judge Posner, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1287, 1287 (1999) (“[E]mpirical knowledge is most useful in 
unmasking the theoretical assumptions that undergird constitutional law . . . .”). 
 44 Crespo, supra note 1, at 2102. 
 45 See id. at 2101–02. 
 46 As noted previously, see supra note 24, these concerns and critiques apply equally to pro-
posals to allow for police or prosecutorial self-regulation. 
 47 See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 505 (2001). 
